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Whither
Consumer
Representation!
In this section we present three
distinct perspectives on the critical
issue of the consumer representation in government and quasigovernment agencies. Silber looks
at the historical development of
the concept, analyzing the roots of
today's limited formal participation
of individuals labeled consumer
representatives. The insights of
Reverby and Cude demonstrate the
diverse aud at times conflicting
roles contemporary consumer representatives play. We welcome
your contributions to this discussion, which may be published in
subsequent issues of ACI.

Consumer Participation
in the Law-Drafting
Process: Past, Present,
and Future
Nomzatt I. Silber '
Hofstra Law School

onsumers seldom realize how
often their rights and responsibilities are determilled by lawdrafting committees. Routinely such
committees draft laws, regulations, and
standards for consumer conduct at the
request of law-making bodies.
Committees often present their proposals to elected legislative or executive
bodjes. Others report their recommendations to regulatory officials. Drafting
work by committees of knowledgeable
experts as well as by representatives of
affected interests is also sponsored by
private professional or industrial associations which adopt proposed laws
and rules as part of a professional or
an industrial standard.
Remarkably, it is the exception
rather than the rule that consumer
affairs professionals participate formally in drafting committees. A cynic
might conclude that their absence
reflects determined efforts to avoid
acquainting consumer professionals
with decisions rhat frequently are
intended to affect consumers adversely.
Today there is no legal or cultural
expectation that consumer professionals should participate routinely in

C

committee drafting efforts in order to
confer legitimacy on them or improve
their results. In this arricle, I explore
past and present attitudes about participation by consumer professionals and
attitudes about how the consumer
interest is represented when they are
absent. I conclude by suggesting how
consumer affairs professionals might
do more to increase respect for their
expertise and to formalize their role in
law-drafting committees.
A recent personal experience illustrates the problem. The chair of a bar
association task force asked me for a
consumer perspective on several proposed changes the drafting committee
had made to a uniform state law governing securities.2 At the time I didn't
know very much about the subject but
that the drafting usually involves the
participation of leading academics and
lawyers who are experts. I decided not
to oppose the law if consumer problems
already had been systematically
identified by consumer participants in
the drafting process and fairly dealt
with by the law drafters.3 Therefore, I
asked whether the new law was "the
product of a process of drafting in
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which there was notable consumer

complete absence of formal, identifi-

argwnents for not formally including

representation." (P. Shupack, personal

able consumer participants in an

consumer participants. Earlier attempts

communication, June 6, 19954.)
The chair consulted with the chief
draftsman or "reporter" and replied
that consumer organizations were not
represented, but consumer participation had been adequate:
I raised this question [and the
reporter] half-jokingly pointed to the
list of members of the drafting committee [principally securities industry
attorneys and government officials
from the Federal Reserve Board and
the Securities and Exchange
Commission] and asked me to draw
my own conclusions. ... l have met a
couple of the Commissioners [and] I
know that they do not have special
connections to the securities industry,
and I believe they are prosperous
enough to have portfolios. So long as
they looked out for their personal
interests as they contemplated Revised
Article 8, there were consumer
advocates involved in the drafting
process. (P. Shupack, personal communication, June 13, 1995, emphasis
added.) According to the chair, lack of
"formal consumer representation"
was not important because some
members of the drafting committee
held a "consumer perspective."

important, lengthy private law-making
process that had considered matters of
importance to consumers. Indeed, the
product left consumers in a position
inferior to their position under existing
law. (facciolo, 1996, p. 1.)
Consumer advocates mainly would
agree, I think, that the "consumer perspective" argument is Aawed. It does
not suffice to assert that an interest has
been adequately considered because of
the inclusion of the personal sympathies of individuals with other distinctive formal roles and responsibilitiesespecially roles that require them to try
to separate themselves from such sympathies. To make the point personally,
I may go swimming every week at the
university pool but when I attend the
university's senate I do not watch out
for the budget of the athletic program
or lobby for the building of an indoor
swimming center. In the securities case,
the fact that some drafters had their
own stock portfolios tells us little or
nothing about whether they represented
the interests of consumers.
The intensity of feeling, the depth of
experience, and the qualiry of a putative
consumer participant's training matter
intensely in assessing whether the participant's involvement demonstrates
that there was adequate consumer participation. The matter of proportional
advocacy or voting strength also should
be taken iJJto account. If a few people
in a drafting group have a "consumer
outlook" but not enough votes among
them to make a significant difference in
the outcome, or enough strength to
make a significant impact on debate, it
is an exaggeration to describe consumer
participation as meaningful.

to involve consumer participants, they
claimed, demonstrated it was roo difficult to choose participants with sufficient legitimacy to defuse consumer
opposition after any legislative compromise was reached. The consumer
interest, they said, was so amorphous,
with so little "political coherence," that
no matter who the consumer participants chosen were, others with different
consumer agendas disavowed the representativeness of the participants.
This political incoherence argument
is not persuasive because drafting and
negotiating bodies seem to value the
participation of other interest groups
despite their weak coherence. They
value bona fide environmental group
participants in negotiations about environmental regulations, and they value
labor unions in labor negotiations,
despite the fact that leaders cannot
always "deliver" their constituencies,
and despite the fact that there are many
different views of the "labor interest" or
the "environmental interest." Moreover,
there are almost always a limited number
of aud1emic consumer organizations
interested in discrete consumer problems, and a finite number of persons
with expertise about discrete kinds of
consumer transactions who are
unaffiliated with regulatory or industry
interests-and who can be said to hold a
consumer viewpoint. The field of appropriate candidates is narrowed further
because few of these organizations and
individttals have the resources and the
incentive to take part in drafting
processes wh.ich require a substantial
commitment of time, energy, and money.
No single consumer participant can
always reflect a multipliciry of competing
consumer priorities. When chosen as
consumer participants, however, those
who are genuine and skilled consumer
participants try to anticipate the reactions of others in whose interest they

THE ''CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE"
ARGUMENT
The reply presented a clear and
superficially logical syllogism: Since (1)
anyone who exercises a consumer role
with regard to a particular product or
service may claim a "consumer perspective" with regard to it; and (2) anyone with a personal consumer perspective will reflect that perspective in a
law-making process in which she or he
is involved; therefore (3) consumers
can be said to participate meaningfully
in many contexts even where formal
consumer representation is missing. In
my example, this logic rationalized the

THE POLITICAL COHERENCE
ARGUMENT
The securities law proponents (returning to my example) advanced other
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believe they are acting. They are not
always successful, but, like their counterparts who represent other interests,
they at least do some highly important
work: they bring a consumer's point of
view to law-making discussions.
Though the rationalizations of "consumer perspective" and "political coherence" may be weak, they resonate with a
great many people. For much of our history, policymakers have on similar
grounds resisted the suggestion that consun1er participation is essential to legitimacy, or they have limited participation
to the opportunity for any member of
the public to be heard at an open hearing
or two. They have accepted the absence
of consun1er participation as the political
science equivalent of a normal, natural
phenomenon. (See Olson, 1967.) They
have argued that consumers are too
diverse a group to be represented by one
or two consumer affairs professionals or
one or two leaders from consumer advocacy organizations and they have argued
that lawmakers have the public interest
at heart and so they take the consumer
interest into account without formal
assistance &om others.
Why has the absence of consumer
participation in law-drafting and rulemaking processes been easily tolerated
by lawmakers and the public generally,
more easily than comparable omissions
of other interests? At the broadest level
it is because the theoretical underpinning for interest-group activities in law
drafting, and for an appreciation of the
role of consumer participants and their
unique contributions to developing
rules, has not been broadly accepted.
This problem merits further discussion.

THE DISTRUST Of SPECIAL INTERESTS
The idea of the participation of discrete
interest groups in lawmaking, whether
through parties or other special groups,
began early in our history. It even frightened the framers of the Constitution.
Political parties and their tendency

toward "faction" were considered threats
to the viability of a democracy. (See
Wood, 1969.) Disinterested, knowledgeable, and objective persons of property
and substance were ideally the makers of
law. The early American political theorists, furthermore, largely subscribed to a
theory of virtual, as opposed to actual
representation of their constituents,
basing their votes not on the views of
their constituents but rather on their own
consciences. Virtual political representation and the danger of factions have
remained powerful elements of American
political thought, working against the
idea that any legislative or deliberative
body must include a membership whose
views or physical characteristics correspond to those of the poptilation.
Along with the widespread effects
of mass production, mass consumption,
and with the rise of views we identify as
Populist, Progressive, or Socialist, in the
later nineteenth century the perception
of a discrete consumer viewpoint began
to emerge in politics, journalism, and
literature. Social reformers urged consumers to assert their interests by making
their views known through their pocketbooks, through boycotts and labor
actions, and by organizing to elect sympathetic political representative to work
for a more "open" political process.
The first of the government agencies
charged during the Progressive Era with
significant consumer responsibilities,
the Food and Drug Administration and
the Federal Trade Commission, were
tasked by Congress to look after the
"public" interest in health and in fair
competition; but in their early years
they were not authorized to solkit consumer opinions or invite consumer participation in the regulatory process. (See
Williams, 1960.)

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
CONSUMER PARTICIPATION
During the New Deal the first special
offices charged with protecting the con-

sumer interest developed and the intellectual rationalization for professional
consumer representation matured.
Franklin D. Roosevelt created a
Consumers Advisory Board to the
National Recovery Administration (NRA),
as well as to the Council of Economic
Advisors and the Agricultural
Adjustment Agency, and Consumers
Counsels to the Coal Commission and
the Public Service Commission. Some in
his Administration even proposed a
Department of the Consumer, which did
not come to pass either then or later. As
these offices were being established a
negative, oppositional reaction to
specialized consumer representation
mounted. Critics questioned the purpose
or need for these offices, the opportunities for political opportunism which they
created, and the logic behind the
appointment of any "John" or "Jane
Does" to represent consumers separately
from government officials charged with
representing the public interest. "Who is
a consumer? Show me a consumer,"
demanded General Hugh johnson, the
head of the NRA (Silber, 1983, p. 15).
I know of two pioneering consumer
economists of this era who tried to
respond to prevailing concerns and
provide a theoretical underpinning for
explicit consumer advice by consumer
professionals to rulemakers and lawmakers. In her book Consumption in
Our Society; Elizabeth Hoyt (1938), a
professor of economics at Iowa State
College, addressed the matter of consmner
representation as a mechanism for (1)
preserving Adam Smith's consumer
sovereignty in the face of governmental
interference with competition (through
such acts as the passage of trade laws),
and as (2) a way to develop consumerfriendly rules in those "fields in which
free private enterprise could not be
expected to operate competitively."
Aggressively asserting that the consumer
interest was identical to the public interest, Professor Hoyt argued that "In the
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consumers' interest alone do we find

ment in later years successfully increased

legitimate consumer participant. A

the interest of aU." She contended that

the participation of advisors ro governors

thorough analysis of the plans that

consumer participation in lawmaking
was essential to create market rules
that permitted meaningful consumer
choices (pp. 85-86). Professor Persia
Campbell, also an economist and a
consumer advocate, complemenred
Hoyt's analysis by trying to give consumer lobbyists a better reputation
than their industry counterparts. She
beEeved that the representation of special interest groups had become "an
integral part of our extra-legal machinery of government" (Campbell, 1949,
p. 556) recognizing that it took
"knowledge and experience on a continuing basis to bring opinion effectively
to bear on the vast range of operations
that affect the consumer interest, but as
yet consumer opinion is not sufficiently
well organized." (p. 562).
Campbell's works-which include
Consumer Representation in the New
Deal and The Consumer Interestalong with those of Professor Hoyt,
were among the serious efforts of that
period to explore the development of
consumer advisory institutions within
governmental units. These did not
challenge the treatment of everyone as a
consumer, and in many ways they
a£Hrmed the viewpoint that anyone
could present her or his own general
view of consumer welfare. They equated
the consumer interest and the public
interest, with the public interest transcending narrow interests. Nonetheless,
while "everyone" was a consumer, they
recognized that people with "knowledge
and experience" needed to come forward and to advocate actively the consumer/public interest.

and to Presidents (Morse, 1993;
Peterson, 1982). Government agencies
and rulemaking bodies at lower levels,
too, slowly became aware of the need to
solicit the opinions of consumer experts.
In 1953, the Food and Drug
Administration initiated a "Consumer
Consultant Program," hiring "highly
qualified women, carefully chosen for
their professional background," as palttirne consultants to seek out consumer
opinions (Williams, 1960). President
Kennedy kept his campaign pledge and
added consumer advisors to the Council
of Economic Advisors, and a consumer
counsel in the Office of the President
(Morse, 1993, p. 173, n. 156). The single
biggest expansion of consumer participation in lawmaking occurred in 1979,
when President Jimmy Carter, spurred by
his Consumer Affairs Council (chaired by
Esther Peterson), issued an executive
order, requiring most federal agencies to
improve their consumer programs.
With exceptions, howt:vt:r, many of
the consumer boards established pursuant to the Executive Order and
through other means in this period
were not composed mainly of knowledgeable consumer affairs professiona ls
(one wonders, of course, where
Peterson might have found many of
them at that time) or of persons who
had made any serious study of consumer problems before they began to
provide their "consumer input." My
impression is that Peterson mostly nurtured existing government officials who
did not have any special consumer
affairs expertise, as well as "John and
Jane Does" who were chosen because
they had an inclination to serve and no
obvious commercial axe to grind. The
involvement of "average consumers"
added currency to the idea that everyone
or anyone could serve as a consumer
representative. It de-emphasized expertise as a minimum qualification for a

were established by Carter's Executive
Order would show whether agencies
established participating roles for consumer affairs professionals or merely
were more open to grass roots complaints from consumers.
During the Reagan and Bush years
there was a backlash against consumer
protection initiatives at the federal level
and some sense that consumer affairs
professionals might be biased in favor
of intrusive regulatory actions (see
Pertschuk, 1982). Formal consumer
participation did not end, since popular sentiment required that an agency
provide satisfactory service ro consumers, who were, after all, taxpayers
and voters. But public cynicism about
the self-interest of public interest lobbyists and their special pleading and
their misplaced paternalism became
deeply entrenched. Severed from identification with the overall public interest,
consumer groups came to be understood as simply aootht:r interest group
whose leaders needed either to organize
to achieve protection or else to leave
consumers to bear the consequences of
underparticipation themselves.s
Subsequently, law drafters generally
declined to acknowledge an obligation
for consumer interests to be vigorously
asserted in lawmaking, or to make any
special place for consumer professionals
in the process of law drafting.

EXPANSION AND CONSTRICDON OF
CONSUMER PARTICIPATION
By adopting the consumer interest/public interest equation and reminding
elected officials that all voters were consumers, leaders of the consumer move-
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TOWARD BROADER ACCEPTANCE OF
FORMAL CONSUMER PARTICIPATION
The challenge for consumer affairs professionals is to develop models for
appropriate consumer participation
that are broadly acceptable in today's
political environment and legal culture.
Ironically, consumer specialists advocating forma l participation have played
into the hands of their opponents by
communicating a number of problematic positions about the nature of con-

swner participation.
Consider the fact that we often have
dwelled on the enormity of the task of
identifying tbe consumer interest, when
the task should in my view be described
as manageable by competently trained
consumer affairs professionals. In her
1949 book, for example, Persia
Campbell emphasized the difficulties
involved:
The formulation of a conswner point
of view is itself likely to be a controversial process. It involves clarification of issues by recognized leaders,
followed by discussion and opinion
making by those especially conscious
of the problems involved; and they
are tremendous (p. 9).
ln the process of emphasizing the enormity of the task, she and other consumer leaders and academics communicated to some a sense of futility about
the value of a specialization in consumer
studies. This may well have led to an
underestimation of the contribution of
professionals. It is a misunderstanding
that needs to be addressed.
Consider that we academics and
consumer leaders have sometimes
argued, in the opposite vein, that consumer interests are readily apparenr and
that consumer interests are identical to
the public good, which often is a matter
of intuitive knowledge of "what's
right." This has fueled the argument
that we are all able to spot the consumer
interest-and that no special consumer
represenration ought to be necessary.
In my view, we might instead work
harder to disentangle consumer interests from other discrete interests (labor,
enviro1m1ental, and civil rights interests,
and even economic efficiency interests
come to mind) which at times compete
with consumer interests when legislative drafting demands viable and
appropriate rules. Doing so would
create the profile of credible consumer
affairs professionals who seek
responsible solutions to complicated

problems. Consumer organizations,
educational programs, and professional
associations might do much more than
at present to train and help to identify
qualified consumer participants who
are able to speak out for and protect
consumer interests within this context.6
1 have here only outlined some
directions in which consumer affa irs
professionals might move intellectually
and pragmatically to improve consumer participation: establishing that
not everyone has a "consumer perspective"; defining the consumer interest in
clear terms; and teaching about the
attributes that will make conswner
affairs professionals valued and
necessary participants in law-drafting
efforts. There remains much work to
be done to understand bow consumer
affairs professionals can be included
more regularly and formally in the
process of consumer law drafting.

Nons
l. Tllis article is adapted from a lecture presented

to rhe Universiry of Wisconsin Deparrmenr of
Consumer Science and the University of
Wisconsin Law School on October 24, 1996.
Thanks to Rima Apple, Professor of Consumer
Sciences for her resourcefulness; ro Rima Apple,
Robin Douthitt, Tom Garman, Cathy Zick,
Stephen Mcili, Robert Mayer and Richard L.D.
Morse for sharing their insight; and ro faculty
and students at UW-Maclison.
2. See Article 8, Uniform Commercial Code,
Revised. This is a set of statutory rules that a
year earlier had been approved by the Amefican
Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws after a
lengthy process which had gone on for several
years. Because these rules must be enacred by
state lcgislamres to become effective, and because
consumer·righrs oriented legislators inhabit some
state legislatures, proponents of rbe UCC oce<lsionully seek the endorsemenr by consumer advocates of new legislative initiatives.
3. Designation as a "participant" in law-making
processes generally confers not more than the
opportunity to offer evidence or opinions tooth·
ers who hold decisive authority about a matter.
Designation as a "representative" in a law-making process generally establishes a larger role
than mere participation which in many representative processes include voting or vero powers.
4. When rhis lerter was written, Professor
Norman Silber was chair of the ABCNY
Consumer Affairs Committee, and Professor Paul

Shu pack was chair, ABCNY Task Force to Study
Revisions to Article 8 of the UCC.
5. The contemporary argument that would leave
consumer interests to fend for themselves was
explored and rejected rwenry years ago. lr is no
longer acceptable to suggest that interest groups
will organize whenever those interests require
protection. Mancur Olson's classic book The
Logic of Collective Action.
6. An organization such as ACCI, for example,
might consider appropriate ways to credential
consumer participants and attempt systematically
to reach out to law-drafting committees; and to
suggest that drafting efforts include the formal
panicipation of persons with training in con·
sumer studies who are without ties ro affected
commercial interests.
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